Heisenberg, Werner. Typed letter signed, 23 September 1947....

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Heisenberg, Werner. Typed letter signed, 23 September 1947. Typed letter signed ("W. Heisenberg"), 2 pages (8.25 x 11.5 in.; 210 x 292 mm.), on separate leaves, in German, on "Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute for Physics" letterhead, Göttingen, 23 September 1947, written to Professor Samuel A. Goudsmit, Northwestern University Department of Physics. Usual folds with some chipping on upper and lower borders; staple holes at left corner. Werner Heisenberg defends his fellow German physicists in a letter written to Samuel Goudsmit, Dutch-American physicist and critic of the German scientists of World War II. "There is especially one item in your statements which, no doubt, is due to a misunderstanding, namely the supposition that we in Germany looked upon the research of the problems with atoms as a sort of race with America, somewhat like the idea that, if we couldn't win the war, at least we could win the peace." Heisenberg writes in full: Dear Goudsmit, I am sending you with the same mail some special publications, among them also the one relating to our work with atoms during the war. In connection with this article I want to write a few words to you. In recent times I have read several of your articles in which you report about the uranium research performed in Germany during the war. From these articles I get the impression that perhaps you didn't know enough about the details of our research and especially, that you were not aware of the psychological situation during the war for those of us who lived in Germany. Not long ago I discussed this matter at length with [Niels] Bohr and he suggested that I should personally write to you about it. As I told you that time in Heidelberg the mood among us was entirely different. From the very beginning we were convinced (as I vigorously emphasized during official meetings in Germany during the war) that America would be able to resolve the uranium problem much faster and better because of its incomparably superior equipment (for instance, 24 cyclotrons versus none in Germany) - as long as it was officially decided to do so. Therefore we never considered a serious competition. We just thought it possible that this problem might perhaps not be tackled at all in America because we imagined that it would be of little importance to the war effort. And so, when you told me in Heidelberg that the American physicists had worked mainly for the war effort and that they didn't pursue the questions pertaining to atoms (naturally, you had to give me such an answer then) I felt that this was plausible, and to that extent we rejoiced that we apparently had done reasonably good work for peace. Your portrayal of a "race among scientists" therefore, does not correctly describe the atmosphere of our research, but I understand quite clearly that it has to be very difficult for you to imagine our psychological situation during the war. The problem was that, after all, we knew only too well what terrible consequences a victory of National Socialism in Europe would entail but that, on the other hand, we had no illusions about the results of a total German defeat because of the hate National Socialism had sown. Such a proposition leads naturally to a more passive and modest attitude, and one would be happy to be content with saving, wherever possible, that which can be salvaged in a small circle of influence, and to hope that later, perhaps some useful work can be done again. - Maybe there will be an opportunity, not too far in the future, when we can talk about these issues more thoroughly than was possible at that time in Heidelberg. Regarding the details of the uranium research in Germany, I think the article in Science contains the essentials, in some places even more precise than what you had learned in that by-gone time. If you have additional questions or doubts in connection with this, I would welcome it if you wrote to me about them. In August I visited Bohr for eight days in Tisvilde and I was very happy about the chance to be in touch with Bohr and the other physicists in Copenhagen and to learn more about the progress that had been made in physics, for instance in the area of cosmic radiation. With best regards, also from the other physicists of our group, yours W. Heisenberg By the 1930s, Heisenberg was recognized as the leading spokesman for physics in Germany. Yet, like many, he found himself in an increasingly awkward position, as Nazi attacks on the academic professions forced the remaining Germans and German institutions into acquiescence with, if not overt support of, the dictatorship. Heisenberg's response was perhaps typical of many educated Germans. There was little chance that he would emigrate voluntarily, despite numerous opportunities and invitations to do so...nation and politics were separable for Heisenberg and, like many, he believed the Nazis would not be in power for long. With the outbreak of war, Heisenberg was dispatched to the Army Weapons Bureau in Berlin to investigate the application of nuclear fission to large-scale energy production. In just two months, Heisenberg had completed an analysis of chain reactions and stated their possible use in the construction of an atomic bomb. The report propelled him to the forefront of specialists in nuclear energy in Germany. During his Berlin years, he directed fission research at the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute for Physics and supervised reactor experiments in Leipzig. Earning the enmity of those colleagues and friends who were opposed to the Nazi regime, Heisenberg continued his efforts until captured by the secret allied ALSOS mission in late spring 1945. Among Heisenberg's harshest critics was Goudsmit, whose parents had died in the holocaust, yet perhaps another factor was a degree of scientific rivalry dating to the 1920s, when Heisenberg managed to resolve a problem concerning helium which had stumped Goudsmit. "Heisenberg's solution was way beyond me," Goudsmit conceded, but at the same time he felt eclipsed. Heisenberg's role in the German bomb program gave Goudsmit a license to attack - not the simple fact that Heisenberg had a role, but Goudsmit's conviction that he was lying about it. In the summer of 1947, Heisenberg published two articles on the failure of the German bomb project in the journals Die Naturwissenschaften and Nature, and Goudsmit was outraged by Heisenberg's thesis. According to Heisenberg, it was the lack of resources and technical support - not knowledge - which stymied the German effort. German physicists were investigating the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; they had no moral desire to construct a bomb and were even trying to stall its production. Goudsmit maintained that Heisenberg and his colleagues wanted to build a bomb, but simply did not know how. According to David Cassidy's Uncertainty: The Life and Science of Werner Heisenberg, the bitter controversy "raged through the pages of The New York Times and in an exchange of long and fascinating letters. In 1948, the American occupation authorities requested that Heisenberg and his colleague Karl Wirtz publish an account of the German effort. The report enabled Heisenberg to reexamine available research reports, and at Heisenberg's insistence, Goudsmit reexamined copies of captured reports in Washington. As a result of this exercise, Goudsmit corrected his most obvious errors (his book on ALSOS had appeared the previous year). Despite a partial reconciliation and Goudsmit's apologies to Heisenberg at their final meeting in 1973, the quarrel was never satisfactorily resolved.