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In October of the Calamitous Year of 1780, Just Weeks After Trusted Subordinate Benedict Arnold's Treason Was Exposed, George Washington Writes Founding Father George Mason on the Desperate State of the Army and Nominates Nathaniel Greene to Reverse the Continental Army's Misfortunes

George Washington Autograph Letter Signed. Four pages on a bifolium leaf, 7.5 x 9 inches (191 x 229 mm). "Hd Qrs" [Headquarters], Passaic Falls [New Jersey], October 22, 1780.

"We are without money... without provision & forage... without clothing and men... and it may be said that the history of this War is a history of false hopes and temporary devices..."

"We must have a permanent force, not a force that is constantly fluctuating... Our civil government must likewise undergo a reform-ample powers must be lodged in Congress as the head of the Federal union, adequate to all the purposes of war..."

A superb letter written as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army to fellow Virginian, Founding Father, and delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention of 1787, George Mason. Washington informs him of Nathanael Greene's appointment as commander of the southern army, replacing Horatio Gates, and asks Mason to lend Greene whatever support he can. Washington then reports on the state of the army, and offers an argument in favor of expanding Congressional powers to prosecute the war.

Washington pens, in full:

Dear Sir,

In consequence of a resolve of Congress directing an enquiry into the conduct of General Gates, and authorizing me to appoint some other officer in his place during the enquiry, I have made choice of Major-General Greene who will, I expect, have the honor of presenting you with this letter.

I can venture to introduce this Gentleman to you as a man of abilities, bravery and coolness. He has a comprehensive knowledge of our affairs, and is a man of fortitude and resources. I have not the smallest doubt therefore of his employing all the means which may be put into his hands to the best advantage-nor of his assisting in pointing out the most likely ones to answer the purposes of his command. With this character, I take the liberty of recommending him to your civilities and support, for I have no doubt, from the embarrassed situation of Southern affairs, of his standing much in need of the latter from every gentleman of influence in the Assemblies of those States.

As General Greene can give you the most perfect information in detail of our present distresses, and future prospects, I shall content myself with giving the aggregate account of them. And with respect to the first, they are so great and complicated, that it is scarcely within the powers of description to give an adequate idea of them-with regard to the second, unless there is a material change both in our military and civil policy, it will be in vain to contend much longer.

We are without money, and have been so for a great length of time; without provision and forage, except what is taken by impress; without cloathing [sic], and shortly shall be (in a manner) without men. In a word we have lived upon expedients till we can live no longer, and it may truly be said that the history of this war, is a history of false hopes and temporary devices, instead of system, and œconomy [sic] which results from it.

If we mean to continue our struggles, (and it is to by hoped we shall not relinquish our claims) we must do it upon an entire new plan. We must have a permanent force, not a force that is constantly fluctuating and sliding from under us as a pedestal of ice would do from a statue in a summer's day, involving us in expence [sic] that baffles all calculation - an expence [sic] which no funds are equal to. - We must at the same time contrive ways and means to aid our Taxes by Loans, and put our finances upon a more certain and stable footing than they are at present. Our civil government must likewise undergo a reform-ample powers must be lodged in Congress as the head of the Federal union, adequate to all the purposes of war. Unless these things are done, our efforts will be in vain, and only serve to accumulate expence [sic] , add to our perplexities, and dissatisfy the people without a prospect of obtaining the prize in view. But these sentiments do not appear well in a hasty letter, without digestion or order. I have not time to give them otherwise, - and shall only assure you that they are well meant, however crude they may appear. With sincere affection, I am D[ear] Sir,
Yr. most obed. Servt.
Go. Washington

By autumn of 1780, Washington had endured a series of misfortunes beginning with the disastrous fall of Charleston, South Carolina in May 1780, which resulted in the capture of 5,000 Continental soldiers and militia, followed by the rout of Gen. Horatio Gates's southern army at the Battle of Camden, South Carolina in August. This letter came just one month after Washington learned that his trusted subordinate, Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold, the man he had appointed as commander of the major Patriot strong point of West Point, New York, was exposed in a treasonous plot to surrender the military stronghold to the British for £20,000.

Washington considered Nathanael Greene to be the perfect candidate to reverse the misfortunes that had befallen the American cause in the South and hoped that George Mason and other southern statesmen would do all they could to help Greene and the cause of independence, especially in the wake of the general anxiety caused by Arnold's treachery. Greene went on to wage one of the most impressive campaigns of the war and his successes in the South made possible Washington's climactic triumph at the Battle of Yorktown one year later, in October 1781.

The humiliating defeat of Gen. Horatio Gates at the Battle of Camden marked the decline of the anti-Washington faction in Congress. Washington's supporters used the opportunity to replace Gates with Greene, who shared his commander's views on the causes of the crises in supply and manpower faced by the Continental Army. Though Greene had been outspoken with his criticisms of Congress while serving as Quartermaster General, Congress, departing from custom, allowed Washington himself to nominate Greene.

Early in the war, Washington had been reluctant to express opinions on political questions. Years of opposition to Parliamentary taxes and British soldiers had left most Americans wary of centralized control and standing armies. In response to deficiencies in supplies of men, food, and material, Washington initiated the practice of writing circular letters to the states requesting supplies and new enlistees. When this was not enough, in early 1777, Washington asked and received temporary extraordinary powers (interpreted by some as dictatorial) to keep his army in the field. After the Valley Forge winter of 1777-1778, Washington grew more aggressive, reluctantly using and delegating the power of impressing supplies directly from farmers and merchants. He blamed state governments, localist Congressmen, and a general decline in virtue among Americans for failing to meet the challenges of the war. The setbacks faced by the Continental Army in 1780 led Washington to issue his most forceful appraisal of American political weakness as the foundation of America's failure to achieve ultimate military victory.

Washington warned Mason about the consequences of the repeated failures of the Continental Congress and the states to keep his army well-supplied and adequately manned. He insisted that he could not keep a respectable army in the field with a force of manpower "that is constantly fluctuating and sliding from under us as a pedestal of ice would leave a statue in a Summer's day." Washington struggled with the army's shortages every year of the war, "each autumn [finding] him threatened with the calamities his men barely had survived the previous winter" (Freeman). Procuring supplies became more and more difficult with the continual devaluation of the Continental dollar, the American paper currency. In fact, after encamping at New Windsor, New York, Washington informed Congress that he was "holding his men together solely by the impressment of flour in New York state" (Freeman). Also, in 1780, Washington had hoped to cooperate with the newly-arrived French army under General Rochambeau in an offensive operation against New York. However, his requests for new levies were met with indifference by the states, causing him to barely meet the requirements for defensive warfare against General Henry Clinton's army in New York.

Washington and several other officers, such as Greene, Alexander Hamilton, and Philip Schuyler (who saw the sufferings of the soldiers at Valley Forge in 1777 and Morristown in 1780), would constitute an emerging bloc of nationalists. Hamilton, for example, wanted to consolidate sovereignty in Congress at the expense of the states, and establish a permanent revenue base. Serving as aide-de-camp to Washington for four years during the Revolution, Hamilton formed a bond with his Commander in Chief that was, as historian Ron Chernow has written, "based less on personal intimacy than on shared experiences of danger and despair and common hopes for America's future... they had drawn the same conclusions: the need for a national army, for centralized power over the states, for a strong executive, and for national unity."

Washington's language is bold and forthright in this prescient letter, which reflects that, "Unless these things are done, our efforts will be in vain, and only serve to accumulate expence, add to our perplexities, and dissatisfy the people without a prospect of obtaining the prize in view." One year later, British forces under General Cornwallis surrendered to Washington and his army at Yorktown.

Condition: Light spotting and toning along the rear folds. Small, expert repair to the second leaf with the "ton" of Washington traced over. Separation along the upper center fold, one fold of the second leaf, and small tear at the upper edge.

References: Freeman, George Washington: A Biography, Volume 5: Victory with the Help of France, 1952.

Provenance: Property of A Distinguished American Collector From The Pacific Northwest


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