Peak season notice: Shipping for this category may take 14–21 business days after cleared payment. Thanks for your patience.
LOT #42006 |
Starting Bid: $4,000
Tench Tilghman Autograph Letter Signed...
Click the image to load the highest resolution version.
Description
Washington's Aide-De-Camp Colonel Tench Tilghman Writes to Congressman Robert Morris Regarding Prisoner Treatment as Political Strategy: "We must oppose our Enemies as much by policy as by Arms"
Tench Tilghman Autograph Letter Signed ("Tench
Tilghman"). Eight pages of a bifolium with separate address
leaf, 8 x 13 inches; Morristown, New Jersey; March 2, 1777. Housed
in a custom hardcover case.Colonel and top aide-de-camp to General George Washington, Tench Tilghman writes to Congressman Robert Morris from Washington's headquarters in Morristown, addressing a major political disagreement between Congress and Washington's camp. Three months earlier in December 1776, General Charles Lee, Washington's second in command, was captured by the British, and this capture posed a significant military and political problem. Colonel Tilghman writes in part:
"Dear Sir
The late determinations of Congress, to refuse the proposed Conferences with General Lee, and to confine the Hessian Field Officers & Col. Campbell strictly because Genl. Howe will not agree to their Exchange for Genl. Lee, have embarrassed his Excellency not a little, and will, in my Opinion, in their consequences, be attended with much public disadvantage. I should not have given you my Sentiments on these Subjects thus freely and confidentially, but I know I can say more to you than the General would wish to say to Congress, least they should construe a freedom of Expression into an abuse and ill use of those extensive powers with which they have lately vested him...
Indeed Members of Congress were not absolutely necessary and any indifferent Gentlemen might have been appointed - But Sir, I fear an evil will result from the refusal of this Conference, much greater than any I have yet mentioned. You very well know, that the disaffected, in the province Pennsylvania chiefly, have ever held up an Argument to the people, that had not Congress from the beginning shewn a greater disposition for War than peace, Matters had never gone to the lengths they have.
And you also may remember what an amazing Influence these doctrines had untill a deputation of Congress met Lord and Genl. Howe upon Staten Island and obliged them to confess, in a manner, that they had no powers beyond those expressed in the Act of Parliament. From that time to this, they have been pretty silent, or at least have made impressions but upon weak Minds.
Now another opportunity offers for them to assert again, that Genl. Lees letter coming thro' Genl. Howe can be construed into nothing more than an overture for an accomodation. And as the letter as I said before, is very mysterious, every man will comment upon it, as it suits his Views and principles.
I shall just mention one Reason more before I conclude the Subject of the Conference. Genl. Lee's influence is very extensive in our Army, and if he should be sent home or any indignity offered to his person, his Friends will directly say, that had his proposition been acceded to, matters might have gone otherwise, and he might have chalked out some plan whereby he might have regained his Liberty."
As a high ranking General, Lee's capture meant a military loss of leadership and skill that the Continental Army needed to reclaim, and yet, the way in which the Americans recovered their General posed a larger political problem because it could potentially destabilize American loyalty and unity. Congress refused a proposed conference involving Lee and used retaliation pressure to force Lee's exchange. Eighteenth-century warfare employed the cartel system, in which prisoners were exchanged on the basis of like-rank, where a General was exchanged for a General and a Colonel was exchanged for a Colonel etc. The Continental Army had no British General that they could trade for Lee, and so the British refusal to exchange was technically legitimate. He writes:
"I will now enter upon the Right that General Howe undoubtedly had to refuse the proposed Exchange of Six Field Officers for Genl. Lee, and of the Impolicy of inflicting Severities upon these Gentlemen in consequence of such refusal.
By the terms of the Cartel settled between Genl. Washington and Genl. Howe, Officers are only to be exchanged for Officers of equal rank; there is no provision made, nor no obligation on either General to accept any number of inferior officers for one of superior Station. Upon this principle alone Genl. Howe stands justifiable upon the refusal."
Congress thus decided to excessively punish British prisoners, including Hessian soldiers and Colonel Archibold Campbell, to force Lee's exchange; a tactic Tilghman argues is unjustifiable and could spread animosity towards the Americans. Tilghman warns "disaffected" people, i.e. Loyalists, will exploit this situation and claim that Congress prefers war over peace. He references the Staten Island Peace Conference in which Lord and General Howe appeared open to peace negotiations and that Lee's letter could be interpreted as a peace overture. Congress rejecting talks conversely gives the impression of being unreasonable and closed-minded.
"It has been a constant Maxim with our Enemies to endeavour to impress all our Officers with the highest Ideas of their Generosity and Justice and of our want of attention to the Concerns of our prisoners among them, by neglecting to make an exchange as far as we have it in our power."
The treatment of prisoners was not only a moral issue but also a strategic play. Regarding brutality against Hessian soldiers, Tilghman asks, "whether it is the best policy to cultivate or alienate the Affections of the Germans." Politically and rhetorically speaking, Tilghman infers that mistreatment will alienate the Germans and further cement their loyalty to the crown, whereas treating them humanely could encourage Hessian desertion from the war and weaken the opposition's numbers. The British were doing just this, treating their captured humanely, which weakened American resolve, and "almost overcome[s their] patriotism." Furthermore, brutality against the captured British forces posed a risk as it could beget an equal retaliation against American officers in captivity and the Continental Army already had depleted numbers.
Tilghman's letter exposes a much more pervasive problem of the Revolutionary War; the internal disputes between Congress and the Army. Congress was making political decisions from afar and was influenced by public pressures while Washington and his staff were focused on military practical realities. The letter in and of itself suggests that tensions had become so fraught that private letters to individuals in Congress, such as Robert Morris, were necessary for communication and influencing policies. Military victories alone were not enough to win the war. Tilghman writes, "we must oppose our Enemies as much by policy as by Arms," admitting that perception, diplomacy, and morale were psychological weapons just as effective and necessary as military strength.
In early 1777, the outcome of the Revolutionary War was highly uncertain, even after Washington's victories at Trenton and Princeton. The Continental Army remained weak, undersupplied, and outmatched after a long winter. This letter reflects a measured approach and interpretation of the realities of war seen on the field, and reflects forward-thinking of public image during and after the war.
A full transcript of the letter is available in the extended description online.
Condition: In overall very fine condition with no evidence of alterations, restorations or losses. The paper in excellent condition with general toning and a deckled edge. Light ink fading commensurate with age, but remains very legible. Page five with a small circular stain bottom right, not obscuring text. The address page with remnants of the original wax seal with conjoining losses and losses at the deepened fold lines.
Provenance:
James S. Copley, San Diego, California; Sotheby's, New York, The James S. Copley Library: Magnificent American, Historical Documents: Second Selection, October 15, 2010, Lot 657.
More Information: Full transcript:
"Dear Sir
The late determinations of Congress, to refuse the proposed Conferences with General Lee, and to confine the Hessian Field Officers & Col. Campbell strictly because Genl. Howe will not agree to their Exchange for Genl. Lee, have embarrassed his Excellency not a little, and will, in my Opinion, in their consequences, be attended with much public disadvantage. I should not have given you my Sentiments on these Subjects thus freely and confidentially, but I know I can say more to you than the General would wish to say to Congress, least they should construe a freedom of Expression into an abuse and ill use of those extensive powers with which they have lately vested him.
If my Sentiments and Reasons should happily coincide with yours upon the occasion, I hope the Influence which you possess in the House, may enable you to obtain such an Alteration in the Measures alluded to, as may be of more advantage to Genl. Lee, whom they are principally intended to serve, and of more essential good to the public.
It is true Genl. Lees letters are so mysterious that it is impossible to form any conjecture of what was to be expected from the Conference. But take it in a personal light, and surely it was hard to refuse him an Interview with two of his Friends, to whom he might have something to communicate, which in his present Situation could not possibly be conveyed by Letter.
If the Conference was intended to communicate any thing of a public Nature, as some parts of Genl. Lees letter seem to hint, some useful information might have been received and no public ill could have accrued, for as these Gentlemen would have only gone to hear but not to negotiate, it would not have been in their powers, if so inclined, to have given up one Inch of the dignity of Congress, or the least particle of the Liberties of their Country.
Indeed Members of Congress were not absolutely necessary and any indifferent Gentlemen might have been appointed — But Sir, I fear an evil will result from the refusal of this Conference, much greater than any I have yet mentioned. You very well know, that the disaffected, in the province Pennsylvania chiefly, have ever held up an Argument to the people, that had not Congress from the beginning shewn a greater disposition for War than peace, Matters had never gone to the lengths they have.
And you also may remember what an amazing Influence these doctrines had untill a deputation of Congress met Lord and Genl. Howe upon Staten Island and obliged them to confess, in a manner, that they had no powers beyond those expressed in the Act of Parliament. From that time to this, they have been pretty silent, or at least have made impressions but upon weak Minds.
Now another opportunity offers for them to assert again, that Genl. Lees letter coming thro' Genl. Howe can be construed into nothing more than an overture for an accomodation. And as the letter as I said before, is very mysterious, every man will comment upon it, as it suits his Views and principles.
I shall just mention one Reason more before I conclude the Subject of the Conference. Genl. Lee's influence is very extensive in our Army, and if he should be sent home or any indignity offered to his person, his Friends will directly say, that had his proposition been acceded to, matters might have gone otherwise, and he might have chalked out some plan whereby he might have regained his Liberty.
They will also say that a Man of Genl. Lees known attachment to the Cause would never have made a proposition injurious to the dignity or Liberty of this Country, and therefore would never have demanded the Conference, had he not expected the most salutary Effects from it.
I will now enter upon the Right that General Howe undoubtedly had to refuse the proposed Exchange of Six Field Officers for Genl. Lee, and of the Impolicy of inflicting Severities upon these Gentlemen in consequence of such refusal.
By the terms of the Cartel settled between Genl. Washington and Genl. Howe, Officers are only to be exchanged for Officers of equal rank; there is no provision made, nor no obligation on either General to accept any number of inferior officers for one of superior Station. Upon this principle alone Genl. Howe stands justifiable upon the refusal.
Had we had an Officer of equal Rank with Genl. Lee in our possession, and Genl. Howe had refused to make the Exchange, the matter would have been very different, we might with Justice have complained, and with Justice also have confined this Officer exactly in the same Manner in which they have confined Genl. Lee, but no farther.
Was Genl. Lee the only Officer of ours in the hands of the Enemy, we might threaten Retaliation with some hopes of good effects resulting from it, but the Congress seem to have forgot that they have upwards of three hundred of our Officers in confinement and out upon parole (subject as Men of honour to obey a recall) upon whom they may inflict the same severities that we can exercise only upon the Hessians taken at Trenton and a few others.
Whether it is the best policy to cultivate or alienate the Affections of the Germans just at this time, I leave you to determine. I will only observe, that the Enemy, fearful of their being in a wavering State, have of late been making use of every artifice to set them against us, and I mentioned to you in my letter respecting the impropriety of Bradford's publication —
Our Field Officers, who have been long prisoners, I dare say thought the preference given to Genl. Lee rather injurious to them, as, had the exchange been accepted, it would probably have been a long time before the Fortune of War would have thrown an equal Number of the same Rank into our hands.
But now that Genl. Howe has waved the Matter, they undoubtedly expected to reap the advantages resulting from the Capture of our Enemies, those of effecting their deliverance.
General Howe has lately called upon General Washington to comply with the Terms of the Cartel settled between them and to send in those very Officers who are now ordered into close confinement by the Resolve of Congress.
In consequence of a resolve passed in January Colo. Campbell had been thrown into Concord Goal and confined in a manner (if you may credit his letter copy of which the General sends to Congress) which would be thought rigorous upon the most atrocious Criminal.
General Howe has heard of this and Yesterday sent out a Flag inveighing against such a proceeding. Genl. Washington has wrote to Boston to have Colo. Campbells confinement mitigated, but this is all he can do, till Congress see fit to take off the present restriction.
Suppose General Howe, taking Example from us, should not only put all the Officers, that he at present has in possession, into close Confinement, but should call for those upon Parole to return and share the same fate. Would they or would they not tax Congress, with having taken a Step (which might have been avoided,) that was the Cause of their Misfortunes.
It has been a constant Maxim with our Enemies to endeavour to impress all our Officers with the highest Ideas of their Generosity and Justice and of our want of attention to the Concerns of our prisoners among them, by neglecting to make an exchange as far as we have it in our power.
And I fear, if there is no relaxation in the Measures, which are the Subjects of this letter, that they will have too good a plea to found their arguments upon.
I scarcely know an Officer who has been permitted to come out upon his parole, but has confessed that he felt a degree of gratitude for his deliverers, that has almost overcome his patriotism, at least so far as to taking up Arms again.
One Gentleman of our acquaintance, has been I believe induced to lay his Commission down, by what to be sure look'd very like an act of Gratitude, but what I always thought a stroke of policy. I dont know that the Gentleman has really laid down his Commission as yet, but from his Conduct I imagine he intends it.
People who have been long in Captivity, grow dispirited, and when they think that their Friends do not make use of the Means which they have in their power to procure their enlargement, they are apt to close with any offers of the Enemy, whereby they may be enabled to return to their families and Connections.
I know that the scale has been so much against us, that we cannot procure the Release of all, but ought to do as much towards it as we possibly can.
I have thus Sir taken the Liberty of troubling you with a number of crude undigested hints, I will not call them Arguments, that occurred to me upon my thoughts on the subject, and were suggested by the Gentlemen of his Excellency's Family in the Course of Conversation upon these Matters.
I am certain we must oppose our Enemies as much by policy as by Arms, if they conquer us in the former the latter will be of small avail.
Fully convinced of this truth, I have been thus full and I fear tedious, but if your patience will hold out perhaps some things may strike you, which you may improve to advantage, and make use of for the purposes for which they were meant, Justice due to Individuals, and the good of my Country and the Cause in which I am most firmly and sincerely engaged.
I can with the same sincerity assure you that I have the most perfect Esteem for your personal Virtues and that I am
Yr. most Affect. hble Servt.
Tench Tilghman."
Auction Info
2026 June 19 The John H. Freund Americana Collection Signature® Auction #6331 (go to Auction Home page)
Proxy Bidding Ends
June
19th
Friday
10:50 am CT
Auction Dates
June
19th
Friday
Proxy Bidding Time Remaining
26 Days
5h 52m 11s
Bids + Registered Phone Bidders: 0
Lot Tracking Activity: 1
Page Views: 33
Buyer's Premium per Lot:
25% of the successful bid (minimum $49) per lot.
This lot is in: 1 -
Signature® Floor Session (Live Floor, Live Phone, Mail, Fax, Internet, and Heritage Live):
(Lots 42001-42298) - 11:00 AM Central Time, Friday, June 19, 2026.
[Proxy bidding ends ten minutes prior to the session start time. Live Proxy bidding on Heritage Live now starts within 2 hours of when the auction opens for proxy bidding and continues through the live session.]
Exhibition Viewing Times, Title Page, Floor Session and License Information
Additional Location Info:
Heritage Auctions - Dallas
2801 W. Airport Freeway
Dallas, TX 75261
Shipping, Taxes, Terms and Bidding
Terms and Conditions | Bidding Guidelines and Bid Increments | Glossary of Terms
Important information concerning Sales Tax and Resale Certificates. Learn More
Terms and Conditions | Bidding Guidelines and Bid Increments | Glossary of Terms