Auction Name: 2026 June 19 The John H. Freund Americana Collection Signature® Auction

Lot Number: 42006

Shortcut to Lot: HA.com/6331*42006

Tench Tilghman Autograph Letter Signed ("Tench Tilghman"). Eight pages of a bifolium with separate address leaf, 8 x 13 inches; Morristown, New Jersey; March 2, 1777. Housed in a custom hardcover case.

Colonel and top aide-de-camp to General George Washington, Tench Tilghman writes to Congressman Robert Morris from Washington's headquarters in Morristown, addressing a major political disagreement between Congress and Washington's camp. Three months earlier in December 1776, General Charles Lee, Washington's second in command, was captured by the British, and this capture posed a significant military and political problem. Colonel Tilghman writes in part:

"Dear Sir

The late determinations of Congress, to refuse the proposed Conferences with General Lee, and to confine the Hessian Field Officers & Col. Campbell strictly because Genl. Howe will not agree to their Exchange for Genl. Lee, have embarrassed his Excellency not a little, and will, in my Opinion, in their consequences, be attended with much public disadvantage. I should not have given you my Sentiments on these Subjects thus freely and confidentially, but I know I can say more to you than the General would wish to say to Congress, least they should construe a freedom of Expression into an abuse and ill use of those extensive powers with which they have lately vested him...

Indeed Members of Congress were not absolutely necessary and any indifferent Gentlemen might have been appointed - But Sir, I fear an evil will result from the refusal of this Conference, much greater than any I have yet mentioned. You very well know, that the disaffected, in the province Pennsylvania chiefly, have ever held up an Argument to the people, that had not Congress from the beginning shewn a greater disposition for War than peace, Matters had never gone to the lengths they have.

And you also may remember what an amazing Influence these doctrines had untill a deputation of Congress met Lord and Genl. Howe upon Staten Island and obliged them to confess, in a manner, that they had no powers beyond those expressed in the Act of Parliament. From that time to this, they have been pretty silent, or at least have made impressions but upon weak Minds.

Now another opportunity offers for them to assert again, that Genl. Lees letter coming thro' Genl. Howe can be construed into nothing more than an overture for an accomodation. And as the letter as I said before, is very mysterious, every man will comment upon it, as it suits his Views and principles.

I shall just mention one Reason more before I conclude the Subject of the Conference. Genl. Lee's influence is very extensive in our Army, and if he should be sent home or any indignity offered to his person, his Friends will directly say, that had his proposition been acceded to, matters might have gone otherwise, and he might have chalked out some plan whereby he might have regained his Liberty."

As a high ranking General, Lee's capture meant a military loss of leadership and skill that the Continental Army needed to reclaim, and yet, the way in which the Americans recovered their General posed a larger political problem because it could potentially destabilize American loyalty and unity. Congress refused a proposed conference involving Lee and used retaliation pressure to force Lee's exchange. Eighteenth-century warfare employed the cartel system, in which prisoners were exchanged on the basis of like-rank, where a General was exchanged for a General and a Colonel was exchanged for a Colonel etc. The Continental Army had no British General that they could trade for Lee, and so the British refusal to exchange was technically legitimate. He writes:

"I will now enter upon the Right that General Howe undoubtedly had to refuse the proposed Exchange of Six Field Officers for Genl. Lee, and of the Impolicy of inflicting Severities upon these Gentlemen in consequence of such refusal.

By the terms of the Cartel settled between Genl. Washington and Genl. Howe, Officers are only to be exchanged for Officers of equal rank; there is no provision made, nor no obligation on either General to accept any number of inferior officers for one of superior Station. Upon this principle alone Genl. Howe stands justifiable upon the refusal."

Congress thus decided to excessively punish British prisoners, including Hessian soldiers and Colonel Archibold Campbell, to force Lee's exchange; a tactic Tilghman argues is unjustifiable and could spread animosity towards the Americans. Tilghman warns "disaffected" people, i.e. Loyalists, will exploit this situation and claim that Congress prefers war over peace. He references the Staten Island Peace Conference in which Lord and General Howe appeared open to peace negotiations and that Lee's letter could be interpreted as a peace overture. Congress rejecting talks conversely gives the impression of being unreasonable and closed-minded.

"It has been a constant Maxim with our Enemies to endeavour to impress all our Officers with the highest Ideas of their Generosity and Justice and of our want of attention to the Concerns of our prisoners among them, by neglecting to make an exchange as far as we have it in our power."

The treatment of prisoners was not only a moral issue but also a strategic play. Regarding brutality against Hessian soldiers, Tilghman asks, "whether it is the best policy to cultivate or alienate the Affections of the Germans." Politically and rhetorically speaking, Tilghman infers that mistreatment will alienate the Germans and further cement their loyalty to the crown, whereas treating them humanely could encourage Hessian desertion from the war and weaken the opposition's numbers. The British were doing just this, treating their captured humanely, which weakened American resolve, and "almost overcome[s their] patriotism." Furthermore, brutality against the captured British forces posed a risk as it could beget an equal retaliation against American officers in captivity and the Continental Army already had depleted numbers.

Tilghman's letter exposes a much more pervasive problem of the Revolutionary War; the internal disputes between Congress and the Army. Congress was making political decisions from afar and was influenced by public pressures while Washington and his staff were focused on military practical realities. The letter in and of itself suggests that tensions had become so fraught that private letters to individuals in Congress, such as Robert Morris, were necessary for communication and influencing policies. Military victories alone were not enough to win the war. Tilghman writes, "we must oppose our Enemies as much by policy as by Arms," admitting that perception, diplomacy, and morale were psychological weapons just as effective and necessary as military strength.

In early 1777, the outcome of the Revolutionary War was highly uncertain, even after Washington's victories at Trenton and Princeton. The Continental Army remained weak, undersupplied, and outmatched after a long winter. This letter reflects a measured approach and interpretation of the realities of war seen on the field, and reflects forward-thinking of public image during and after the war.

A full transcript of the letter is available in the extended description online.

Condition: In overall very fine condition with no evidence of alterations, restorations or losses. The paper in excellent condition with general toning and a deckled edge. Light ink fading commensurate with age, but remains very legible. Page five with a small circular stain bottom right, not obscuring text. The address page with remnants of the original wax seal with conjoining losses and losses at the deepened fold lines.

Provenance:
James S. Copley, San Diego, California; Sotheby's, New York, The James S. Copley Library: Magnificent American, Historical Documents: Second Selection, October 15, 2010, Lot 657.

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